URLhaus: ClickFix Malicious URLs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt targets adversaries leveraging ClickFix malware to deliver malicious payloads through compromised web links, aiming to intercept initial infection vectors before they establish persistence. Proactively hunting these specific URL patterns in Azure Sentinel is critical because early detection of ClickFix activity allows the SOC team to block lateral movement and prevent data exfiltration driven by this high-severity threat family.

IOC Summary

Threat: ClickFix Total URLs: 7 Active URLs: 2

KQL: Url Dns Hunt

// Hunt for DNS resolution of URLhaus malicious domains
// Threat: ClickFix
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["gerenland.click"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Url Proxy Hunt

// Hunt for web traffic to URLhaus malicious domains
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["gerenland.click"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where RequestURL has_any (malicious_domains) or DestinationHostName has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, RequestURL, DestinationHostName, DeviceAction
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Required Data Sources

References

• URLhaus

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the URLhaus: ClickFix Malicious URLs detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with suggested filters or exclusions:

• Endpoint Management Patch Deployment

  • Scenario: The organization utilizes Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (MECM/SCCM) to deploy a critical security update. During the deployment window, the SCCM client service (ccmexec.exe) downloads a large patch package from a newly registered vendor repository that shares IP infrastructure with known ClickFix domains. This triggers the rule as the download URL matches the malicious signature pattern before the reputation score fully stabilizes.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion for traffic originating from the ccmexec.exe process (PID or Image Path) specifically targeting URLs containing keywords like /updates, /packages, or specific vendor subdomains known to be safe, provided they are whitelisted in the organization’s internal DNS allowlist.

• Automated Software License Renewal

  • Scenario: A scheduled Task Scheduler job runs nightly at 02:00 AM using a custom PowerShell script (LicenseCheck.ps1) to verify and renew licenses for enterprise software suites (e.g., Adobe Creative Cloud or AutoCAD). The script queries the vendor’s activation server, which recently migrated its API endpoint to a domain that overlaps with ClickFix’s threat intelligence feed.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude alerts where the source process is powershell.exe running under the context of a specific scheduled task (identified by Task Name or GUID) and the destination URL contains standard license verification paths (e.g., /api/v1/license, /activation).

• Cloud Backup Agent Synchronization

  • Scenario: The enterprise uses Veeam Backup & Replication. During its daily incremental backup window, the Veeam agent (`VeeamAgent