URLhaus: 185-132-53-171-8888 Malicious URLs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt targets adversary behavior involving command-and-control or phishing activities originating from the specific IP address 185.132.53.171 on port 8888, as identified by URLhaus threat intelligence. Proactively hunting for these malicious URLs in Azure Sentinel is critical to detect early-stage lateral movement or data exfiltration attempts before they escalate into a confirmed incident.

IOC Summary

Threat: 185-132-53-171-8888 Total URLs: 3 Active URLs: 0

KQL: Url Dns Hunt

// Hunt for DNS resolution of URLhaus malicious domains
// Threat: 185-132-53-171-8888
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["185.132.53.171"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Url Proxy Hunt

// Hunt for web traffic to URLhaus malicious domains
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["185.132.53.171"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where RequestURL has_any (malicious_domains) or DestinationHostName has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, RequestURL, DestinationHostName, DeviceAction
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Required Data Sources

References

• URLhaus

False Positive Guidance

Here are four specific false positive scenarios for the URLhaus: 185-132-53-171-8888 Malicious URLs detection rule, along with targeted filtering strategies:

• Automated Patch Management Scans

  • Scenario: The enterprise patch management system (e.g., Microsoft System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Ivanti Endpoint Manager) initiates a scheduled nightly job to scan all endpoints for the latest security definitions. During this process, the agents query an external repository hosted on 185-132-53-171:8888 to verify signature integrity before downloading updates.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create a rule exclusion based on the Process Name (ccmexec.exe for SCCM or IvantiAgentService.exe) and restrict the alert to traffic originating from the specific Source IP Subnet of the Patch Management Server farm, rather than individual user workstations.

• Third-Party SIEM Log Forwarding

  • Scenario: The organization’s centralized logging solution (e.g., Splunk Universal Forwarder or Datadog Agent) is configured to push high-volume telemetry data to an external ingestion endpoint for real-time analytics. This specific URL (185-132-53-171:8888) serves as a dedicated API gateway for the SIEM vendor, generating frequent HTTP POST requests that mimic malicious scanning behavior due to the volume of unique user-agent strings.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Implement an exclusion based on the Destination Port (specifically 8888 if it is non-standard for web browsing in your environment) combined with a whitelist of HTTP User-Agent headers associated with the SIEM forwarder software (e.g., containing