This hunt detects adversary activity linked to the Vidar malware family by identifying matches against a curated set of 34 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) within Azure Sentinel logs. Proactively hunting for these specific IOCs is critical because Vidar’s modular architecture allows it to persist and exfiltrate data across diverse environments, requiring early detection before lateral expansion occurs.
Malware Family: Vidar Total IOCs: 34 IOC Types: ip:port, url, domain
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| url | hxxps://jiy.psgiran.news/ | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| domain | jiy.psgiran.news | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| url | hxxps://jiy.jangkarsm188.top/ | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| domain | jiy.jangkarsm188.top | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| ip:port | 178[.]104[.]119[.]162:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| ip:port | 77[.]42[.]88[.]66:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| ip:port | 167[.]233[.]114[.]81:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| ip:port | 167[.]233[.]207[.]52:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| ip:port | 167[.]233[.]193[.]229:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| ip:port | 91[.]98[.]87[.]85:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| ip:port | 167[.]233[.]198[.]35:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| ip:port | 167[.]233[.]204[.]162:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| domain | fog.psgiran.news | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| domain | gpy.psgiran.news | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| domain | iii.psgiran.news | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| domain | fog.jangkarsm188.top | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| domain | gpy.jangkarsm188.top | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| domain | iii.jangkarsm188.top | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| url | hxxps://167[.]233[.]204[.]162/ | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| url | hxxps://77[.]42[.]88[.]66/ | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| url | hxxps://167[.]233[.]114[.]81/ | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| url | hxxps://167[.]233[.]207[.]52/ | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| url | hxxps://167[.]233[.]193[.]229/ | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| url | hxxps://91[.]98[.]87[.]85/ | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
| url | hxxps://167[.]233[.]198[.]35/ | botnet_cc | 2026-06-29 | 100% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["167.233.193.229", "91.98.87.85", "167.233.114.81", "167.233.204.162", "167.233.207.52", "167.233.198.35", "178.104.119.162", "77.42.88.66"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["167.233.193.229", "91.98.87.85", "167.233.114.81", "167.233.204.162", "167.233.207.52", "167.233.198.35", "178.104.119.162", "77.42.88.66"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["jiy.psgiran.news", "jiy.jangkarsm188.top", "fog.psgiran.news", "gpy.psgiran.news", "iii.psgiran.news", "fog.jangkarsm188.top", "gpy.jangkarsm188.top", "iii.jangkarsm188.top"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt for access to known malicious URLs
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_urls = dynamic(["https://jiy.psgiran.news/", "https://jiy.jangkarsm188.top/", "https://167.233.204.162/", "https://77.42.88.66/", "https://167.233.114.81/", "https://167.233.207.52/", "https://167.233.193.229/", "https://91.98.87.85/", "https://167.233.198.35/", "https://gpy.jangkarsm188.top/", "https://iii.jangkarsm188.top/", "https://fog.psgiran.news/", "https://gpy.psgiran.news/", "https://iii.psgiran.news/", "https://178.104.119.162/", "https://steamcommunity.com/profiles/76561198680197300", "https://telegram.me/af97ri", "https://fog.jangkarsm188.top/"]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Url has_any (malicious_urls)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, ActionType, IsClickedThrough
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DnsEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
UrlClickEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Vidar IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with suggested filters or exclusions:
Endpoint Protection Scanning of Known Software Repositories
C:\Program Files\ directory. During this process, they generate network connections to update definition servers or verify file hashes against known good software installers (such as Adobe Acrobat Reader or Java Runtime updates) that share hash signatures with benign Vidar components used in internal development tools.NT SERVICE\DefenderSvc or CrowdStrike Falcon Sensor) and restrict the rule to only alert on connections initiated by user-level processes, not system-level scanning services.Scheduled Patch Management Deployment
ccmexec.exe or ivagent.exe) establishes connections to the distribution point servers, triggering the IOC match due to the shared executable hash of the deployment package.*\Microsoft\CCM\*, *\Ivanti\Agent\*) and whitelist the specific destination IP ranges of the internal Software Distribution Points.CI/CD Pipeline Artifact Retrieval