This hypothesis posits that adversaries are leveraging Vidar malware to establish persistence and exfiltrate sensitive data through known indicators of compromise within the Azure environment. The SOC team should proactively hunt for these specific IOCs in Azure Sentinel to rapidly identify early-stage infections before they escalate into broader lateral movement or data theft incidents.
Malware Family: Vidar Total IOCs: 2 IOC Types: url
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| url | hxxps://afsd.net/ | payload_delivery | 2026-07-19 | 75% |
| url | hxxps://kayhector.com/ | payload_delivery | 2026-07-19 | 75% |
// Hunt for access to known malicious URLs
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_urls = dynamic(["https://afsd.net/", "https://kayhector.com/"]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Url has_any (malicious_urls)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, ActionType, IsClickedThrough
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
UrlClickEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Vidar IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with suggested filters and exclusions:
Antivirus Definition Updates via Windows Update or Third-Party Agents
MsMpEng.exe (Microsoft Antimalware), CfsService.exe (CrowdStrike), or s1service.exe (SentinelOne) and the event timestamp aligns with the organization’s known patching window.Enterprise Software Deployment via SCCM or Intune
ccmexec.exe or DeviceManagementService.exe) may extract and execute installers that contain libraries or scripts matching Vidar IOCs.ccmexec.exe, IntuneManagementExtension.exe, or TaskScheduler where the command line arguments include specific deployment identifiers (e.g., /quiet /norestart) and the user context is a known service account (e.g., DOMAIN\svc_deploy).Scheduled Maintenance Jobs for Backup and Data Archiving