ThreatFox: Vidar IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt targets adversary behavior where the Vidar malware establishes persistence to exfiltrate credentials, sensitive documents, and cryptocurrency wallets from compromised endpoints. Proactively hunting for these specific IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical because early detection of Vidar’s data theft mechanisms allows the SOC team to contain lateral movement and prevent significant financial loss before large-scale exfiltration occurs.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Vidar Total IOCs: 22 IOC Types: md5_hash, url, domain, sha1_hash, sha256_hash

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
url	`hxxps://targe.in/`	payload_delivery	2026-07-18	75%
url	`hxxps://pressurewashingsacramento.net/`	payload_delivery	2026-07-18	75%
domain	`sei.ambiltogel.net`	botnet_cc	2026-07-17	100%
url	`hxxps://sei.ambiltogel.net/`	botnet_cc	2026-07-17	100%
sha256_hash	`7073018596b174f584299d5152cf90f89a1f4e3bf072b778fc3342fda5c82f4f`	payload	2026-07-17	95%
sha1_hash	`915456ad1037056f7b542db11a97011da74d710f`	payload	2026-07-17	95%
md5_hash	`c45f291fda8740a843202a77180a15a1`	payload	2026-07-17	95%
sha1_hash	`f6d6bf43990bde77af73d24f237c86889adacbfd`	payload	2026-07-17	95%
md5_hash	`240861bb6ee7723f0a7449ec501c466b`	payload	2026-07-17	95%
sha1_hash	`3ec44d141f4d08ada015759eb2c5c79d76b53c54`	payload	2026-07-17	95%
md5_hash	`cf4866e9f6c60a4b253de4bb85f4da90`	payload	2026-07-17	95%
sha256_hash	`8ca5069041a3de3536f0be3b8f1b9044a0dfffd0295d7495cbd57d6a312af0b5`	payload	2026-07-17	95%
sha256_hash	`06ba715b44892af143c4336c189c28b5d95f446d3d07ca7ce7a6ab2a0601168b`	payload	2026-07-17	95%
sha1_hash	`904eed155444a8ba021d2f6b1c1bb6c89cb739e7`	payload	2026-07-17	95%
md5_hash	`0a9a59c9e53e6d9f218fc6c307016b44`	payload	2026-07-17	95%
sha256_hash	`2fdcac512cef51c5b0d8a4fb23c278b973d20978aab5d463abbe131dd04879a0`	payload	2026-07-17	95%
md5_hash	`7514a13877ee29b842859862663a03ed`	payload	2026-07-17	95%
sha256_hash	`c13be88a14d2c50b4e5ebca6b490fd6b8a6982555051c58b1d45fef6011671ee`	payload	2026-07-17	95%
sha1_hash	`3dd7b3bbb0dcfe89e1a3ff1c1b0abcd5371b706e`	payload	2026-07-17	95%
md5_hash	`057739a12fa0d25a1017e5f7a8538140`	payload	2026-07-17	95%
sha256_hash	`8d5025b2ab7917dc3283738d91634a741d1bc3e03196d2855a1fd81fd9d80381`	payload	2026-07-17	95%
sha1_hash	`7df07eb1b7ba163c1a97b2120f15fdfb4bbc0cd6`	payload	2026-07-17	95%

KQL: Domain Hunt

// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["sei.ambiltogel.net"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Url Hunt

// Hunt for access to known malicious URLs
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_urls = dynamic(["https://targe.in/", "https://pressurewashingsacramento.net/", "https://sei.ambiltogel.net/"]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Url has_any (malicious_urls)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, ActionType, IsClickedThrough
| order by Timestamp desc

KQL: Hash Hunt

// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["7073018596b174f584299d5152cf90f89a1f4e3bf072b778fc3342fda5c82f4f", "915456ad1037056f7b542db11a97011da74d710f", "c45f291fda8740a843202a77180a15a1", "f6d6bf43990bde77af73d24f237c86889adacbfd", "240861bb6ee7723f0a7449ec501c466b", "3ec44d141f4d08ada015759eb2c5c79d76b53c54", "cf4866e9f6c60a4b253de4bb85f4da90", "8ca5069041a3de3536f0be3b8f1b9044a0dfffd0295d7495cbd57d6a312af0b5", "06ba715b44892af143c4336c189c28b5d95f446d3d07ca7ce7a6ab2a0601168b", "904eed155444a8ba021d2f6b1c1bb6c89cb739e7", "0a9a59c9e53e6d9f218fc6c307016b44", "2fdcac512cef51c5b0d8a4fb23c278b973d20978aab5d463abbe131dd04879a0", "7514a13877ee29b842859862663a03ed", "c13be88a14d2c50b4e5ebca6b490fd6b8a6982555051c58b1d45fef6011671ee", "3dd7b3bbb0dcfe89e1a3ff1c1b0abcd5371b706e", "057739a12fa0d25a1017e5f7a8538140", "8d5025b2ab7917dc3283738d91634a741d1bc3e03196d2855a1fd81fd9d80381", "7df07eb1b7ba163c1a97b2120f15fdfb4bbc0cd6"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`DeviceFileEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DnsEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`UrlClickEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Vidar

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Vidar IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with suggested filters or exclusions:

Endpoint Protection Scanning of Legacy Archives
- Scenario: Enterprise Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) perform deep scans on large legacy backup archives (.zip or .7z) stored in network shares. These archives often contain older versions of the Vidar malware samples used for internal training or historical threat intelligence research, triggering alerts when the EDR engine extracts and hashes these files.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion rule to suppress alerts where the parent process is the specific EDR scanning service (e.g., C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike\fs.exe or MsMpEng.exe) AND the file path resides within designated “Threat Intel Research” or “Legacy Archive” directories.
Automated Software Deployment of Development Builds
- Scenario: The IT Operations team uses deployment tools like Ansible, SCCM (System Center Configuration Manager), or Octopus Deploy to push internal development builds to developer workstations. These builds frequently include a sandboxed instance of the Vidar malware IOC set for security testing purposes, which appears as an active process execution during the deployment window.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude events where the initiating user is a service account (e.g., svc-deploy, admin-automation) AND the execution path matches the standard software distribution folder (e.g., C:\Program Files\Octopus Deploy\ or D:\SoftwareDistribution\).
Scheduled Threat Intelligence Feed Updates
- Scenario: The Security Operations Center runs a scheduled PowerShell job using tools like Splunk Enterprise Security or Elastic SIEM to ingest and parse the daily