This hypothesis posits that adversaries are actively deploying the Remcos remote access trojan to establish persistent footholds and exfiltrate sensitive data via its known indicators of compromise. The SOC team should proactively hunt for these specific IOCs within Azure Sentinel to rapidly identify early-stage infections before they escalate into broader lateral movement or data breach incidents.
Malware Family: Remcos Total IOCs: 6 IOC Types: ip:port
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 46[.]151[.]182[.]138:7312 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-04 | 75% |
| ip:port | 211[.]159[.]223[.]14:21891 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-04 | 75% |
| ip:port | 185[.]115[.]164[.]60:59802 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-04 | 75% |
| ip:port | 185[.]115[.]164[.]59:61737 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-04 | 75% |
| ip:port | 103[.]11[.]41[.]19:4155 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-04 | 75% |
| ip:port | 103[.]11[.]41[.]19:52462 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-04 | 75% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Remcos
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["185.115.164.59", "103.11.41.19", "211.159.223.14", "46.151.182.138", "185.115.164.60"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["185.115.164.59", "103.11.41.19", "211.159.223.14", "46.151.182.138", "185.115.164.60"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Remcos IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment, including suggested filters or exclusions:
Endpoint Protection Scanning of Legacy Archives
C:\ProgramData\Legacy_Backups directory. This directory contains archived installer packages from three years ago that include legitimate Remcos-based remote management tools used by former vendors. The EDR engine flags these static files against the active IOCs during its nightly heuristic sweep.C:\ProgramData\Legacy_Backups directory path from the hunting logic, provided the files have not been modified in the last 90 days.Software Deployment via Configuration Management
C:\Tools\Support_Remcos on every target machine, triggering the rule immediately upon file creation.C:\Tools\Support_Remcos\*) associated with the approved deployment package. Additionally, filter alerts where the process creating these files is identified as ansible-playbook.exe or the service account svc-deploy-automation.Scheduled Maintenance and Log Rotation Tasks