ThreatFox: BumbleBee IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt targets adversary behavior linked to the BumbleBee threat actor by actively searching for three specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) across network and endpoint logs within Azure Sentinel. Proactively hunting for these signatures is critical because early detection of this high-severity activity allows the SOC team to identify potential compromise before lateral expansion occurs, leveraging Sentinel’s real-time correlation capabilities to accelerate response times.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: BumbleBee Total IOCs: 3 IOC Types: sha256_hash

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
sha256_hash	`fee27090c90ed20350a65616c658f158bef9443ada21279c11cc9dbd125d363e`	payload	2026-06-30	50%
sha256_hash	`dff350f69d90cf8e6055054475b0c892b77610c734111c381dfbad8bb72b2b3d`	payload	2026-06-30	50%
sha256_hash	`7c71f81b6e981eb71d442a7e26df9ebf199665e5460da3b35b43496b380840a8`	payload	2026-06-30	50%

KQL: Hash Hunt

// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - BumbleBee
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["fee27090c90ed20350a65616c658f158bef9443ada21279c11cc9dbd125d363e", "dff350f69d90cf8e6055054475b0c892b77610c734111c381dfbad8bb72b2b3d", "7c71f81b6e981eb71d442a7e26df9ebf199665e5460da3b35b43496b380840a8"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`DeviceFileEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — BumbleBee

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: BumbleBee IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with suggested filters or exclusions:

Endpoint Protection Scanning of Quarantine Archives
- Scenario: The organization’s endpoint protection suite (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) performs a scheduled deep scan of the “Quarantine” folder on file servers. This folder contains archived, known-malicious samples previously ingested by the SOC for analysis, including historical BumbleBee variants. The scanning engine generates network traffic and process execution events matching the 3 specific IOCs (e.g., specific DLL hashes or command-line arguments) as it re-indexes these static files.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude alerts where the source host is a dedicated File Server role AND the parent process is the Endpoint Protection service (e.g., C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike\fsagent.exe or MsMpEng.exe). Additionally, filter out events originating from paths containing \Quarantine\ or \ThreatRepository\.
Software Deployment via Configuration Management
- Scenario: The IT Operations team utilizes Ansible or Microsoft SCCM (Configuration Manager) to deploy a security patch update that includes a dependency library known to share a hash with one of the BumbleBee IOCs. During the deployment window, the configuration management agent extracts and executes this library on thousands of workstations simultaneously, triggering the detection logic due to the presence of the specific file hash and associated network beaconing behavior.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create a rule exclusion based on the “Parent Process Name” being ccmexec.exe (SCCM) or ansible-playbook, combined with a time-based filter for standard maintenance windows (e.g., 02: