This hunt targets adversary behavior characterized by the execution of AsyncRAT remote access trojan components and their communication with known malicious infrastructure across the organization’s endpoints. Proactively hunting for these specific IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical to rapidly identify early-stage lateral movement and command-and-control activities before they escalate into full-scale data exfiltration incidents.
Malware Family: AsyncRAT Total IOCs: 10 IOC Types: ip:port
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 64[.]89[.]161[.]190:6606 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-16 | 75% |
| ip:port | 5[.]56[.]25[.]238:6606 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-16 | 75% |
| ip:port | 5[.]56[.]25[.]238:6723 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-16 | 75% |
| ip:port | 5[.]56[.]25[.]238:7707 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-16 | 75% |
| ip:port | 37[.]60[.]239[.]250:7777 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-16 | 75% |
| ip:port | 217[.]60[.]241[.]10:6606 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-16 | 75% |
| ip:port | 207[.]180[.]250[.]181:20300 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-16 | 75% |
| ip:port | 147[.]124[.]219[.]0:8805 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-16 | 75% |
| ip:port | 104[.]168[.]134[.]25:6606 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-16 | 75% |
| ip:port | 5[.]56[.]25[.]178:7019 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-16 | 100% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - AsyncRAT
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["5.56.25.238", "104.168.134.25", "37.60.239.250", "217.60.241.10", "64.89.161.190", "147.124.219.0", "207.180.250.181", "5.56.25.178"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["5.56.25.238", "104.168.134.25", "37.60.239.250", "217.60.241.10", "64.89.161.190", "147.124.219.0", "207.180.250.181", "5.56.25.178"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: AsyncRAT IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with suggested filters or exclusions:
Endpoint Protection Scanning of Quarantined Archives
C:\Quarantine directory. This directory contains archived versions of known malicious samples, including historical AsyncRAT binaries, which are flagged by the detection logic as active threats despite being isolated and benign in this context.\Quarantine\, \Staging\, or \Backup\ from the alert criteria. Additionally, filter out events where the process executing the scan is the EDR service itself (e.g., csagent.exe or MsMpEng.exe).Software Deployment via Configuration Management Tools
ccmexec.exe, Ansible-Runner.exe) and restrict the rule to only trigger if the parent process is not a trusted system service or deployment tool.Automated Patch Management and Update Rollouts
%TEMP% which match the AsyncRAT file hashes, causing transient alerts across