ThreatFox: Venus Stealer IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt targets adversary behavior where threat actors deploy the Venus Stealer malware to exfiltrate sensitive credentials and data by leveraging six specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs). Proactively hunting for these IOCs within Azure Sentinel is critical because early detection of this stealer prevents lateral movement and limits the scope of potential data breaches before they escalate into major incidents.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Venus Stealer Total IOCs: 6 IOC Types: md5_hash, sha256_hash, sha1_hash

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
sha256_hash	`746c06f05b8e3bc93d6495a6c447c3c1874bd77011c33b0bcfe74ae27addbfaf`	payload	2026-07-13	95%
sha1_hash	`6ce65e50e8b91686e401e7fda41935a04503a2a6`	payload	2026-07-13	95%
md5_hash	`474de2155ee5c575d408806412c90411`	payload	2026-07-13	95%
sha256_hash	`4049128f0308d05dcb8d24b668f69238d720199de32ba0d8304cd3c3b3bde1b9`	payload	2026-07-13	95%
sha1_hash	`b35a83420c9d263788f785d5d0e0c64801521a52`	payload	2026-07-13	95%
md5_hash	`1b707c3c5fbb377d78c06eff79829490`	payload	2026-07-13	95%

KQL: Hash Hunt

// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - Venus Stealer
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["746c06f05b8e3bc93d6495a6c447c3c1874bd77011c33b0bcfe74ae27addbfaf", "6ce65e50e8b91686e401e7fda41935a04503a2a6", "474de2155ee5c575d408806412c90411", "4049128f0308d05dcb8d24b668f69238d720199de32ba0d8304cd3c3b3bde1b9", "b35a83420c9d263788f785d5d0e0c64801521a52", "1b707c3c5fbb377d78c06eff79829490"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`DeviceFileEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Venus Stealer

False Positive Guidance

Here are specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Venus Stealer IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with suggested filters or exclusions:

Endpoint Protection Scanning of Quarantine Archives
- Scenario: Enterprise Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) periodically scan the C:\ProgramData\ThreatFox\Quarantine directory. If a previously flagged Venus Stealer sample was ingested into the quarantine folder for analysis, the EDR’s real-time scanning engine may trigger the detection rule when accessing the specific hash or file path associated with the IOCs during its routine sweep.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes running under the C:\ProgramData\ThreatFox directory and specific EDR service accounts (e.g., svc-falcon, LocalSystem) from triggering alerts on these specific IOC hashes if the file age is greater than 7 days.
Scheduled Antivirus Definition Updates
- Scenario: During a nightly maintenance window, the organization’s centralized AV management console (e.g., Symantec Endpoint Protection or Carbon Black) pushes updated signature packs that include reference samples of known threats like Venus Stealer for “passive monitoring.” The update service (Antimalware Service Executable or Symantec Antivirus) may instantiate these IOCs in memory to validate the new definitions, triggering a hit on the detection logic despite no actual infection occurring.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion rule for the specific process names of the AV update services (e.g., ccSvcHst.exe, Symantec Antivirus) and restrict alerting to business hours only, or exclude events where the “Event Type” is flagged as “Signature Validation” rather than “Malware Detection.”
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