ThreatFox: SmartApeSG IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt targets adversary behavior characterized by network connections or file hashes matching six specific indicators of compromise linked to the SmartApeSG threat actor. Proactively searching for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical because early detection of this known campaign allows the SOC team to isolate affected assets before lateral movement or data exfiltration occurs.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: SmartApeSG Total IOCs: 6 IOC Types: url, domain

KQL: Domain Hunt

// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - SmartApeSG
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["emberlattice.top"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Url Hunt

// Hunt for access to known malicious URLs
// Source: ThreatFox - SmartApeSG
let malicious_urls = dynamic(["https://emberlattice.top/claims/redirect-state.js", "https://emberlattice.top/claims/metrics-bundle", "https://emberlattice.top/claims/realm-fetch.js", "https://emberlattice.top/callback/signin-validator", "https://emberlattice.top/callback/health-sandbox.js"]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Url has_any (malicious_urls)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, ActionType, IsClickedThrough
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

References

• ThreatFox — SmartApeSG

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: SmartApeSG IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment, including suggested filters and exclusions:

• Endpoint Security Engine Updates

  • Scenario: The organization’s Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solution, such as CrowdStrike Falcon or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, automatically downloads and executes a signature update package. This process may temporarily spawn a legitimate service (e.g., MsMpEng.exe or csfalconagent.exe) that resolves to an IP address or hash matching one of the SmartApeSG IOCs due to shared infrastructure or a benign third-party vendor overlap.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude traffic and process executions originating from known EDR update servers (e.g., specific IP ranges like 137.254.x.x for CrowdStrike) or whitelist the specific SHA-256 hashes of the EDR updater executables within the detection rule logic.

• Scheduled Patch Management Jobs

  • Scenario: A nightly scheduled job running on a central management server (e.g., SCCM/MECM or Ivanti) pushes security patches to workstations. During this window, the patch deployment agent (ccmexec.exe or ivanti-agent) establishes outbound connections to software repositories that may host content mirroring SmartApeSG IOCs, triggering a match on network flow logs.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion based on the source process name (e.g., ccmexec.exe, IvAntiAgent.exe) combined with the specific time window of the maintenance schedule (e.g., 02:00–04:00 UTC), ensuring alerts only trigger outside these defined windows.

• IT Administration and Asset Discovery

  • Scenario: