This hunt hypothesis posits that adversaries are actively leveraging the specific set of 12 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) linked to the Aisuru threat actor to establish persistence or exfiltrate data within our environment. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical because early detection of this known high-severity threat allows the SOC team to rapidly isolate affected assets and mitigate potential lateral movement before a full-scale incident occurs.
Malware Family: Aisuru Total IOCs: 12 IOC Types: ip:port
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 152[.]42[.]214[.]91:9035 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-08 | 100% |
| ip:port | 159[.]203[.]1[.]105:8443 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-08 | 100% |
| ip:port | 159[.]203[.]1[.]105:8001 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-08 | 100% |
| ip:port | 159[.]65[.]133[.]214:8001 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-08 | 100% |
| ip:port | 120[.]205[.]80[.]152:8001 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-08 | 100% |
| ip:port | 165[.]232[.]169[.]49:8001 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-08 | 100% |
| ip:port | 157[.]245[.]59[.]180:9034 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-08 | 100% |
| ip:port | 152[.]42[.]214[.]91:8001 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-08 | 100% |
| ip:port | 165[.]232[.]169[.]49:5555 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-08 | 100% |
| ip:port | 159[.]65[.]133[.]214:8443 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-08 | 100% |
| ip:port | 159[.]203[.]1[.]105:8080 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-08 | 100% |
| ip:port | 159[.]203[.]1[.]105:12345 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-08 | 100% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Aisuru
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["120.205.80.152", "165.232.169.49", "152.42.214.91", "159.65.133.214", "159.203.1.105", "157.245.59.180"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["120.205.80.152", "165.232.169.49", "152.42.214.91", "159.65.133.214", "159.203.1.105", "157.245.59.180"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Aisuru IOCs detection rule, tailored for an enterprise environment:
Endpoint Protection Scanning of Quarantine Archives
C:\ProgramData\Antivirus\Quarantine directory path. Additionally, add a filter for processes running under the service account svc-antivirus-scanner where the parent process is the EDR agent itself (e.g., CsAgent.exe).Software Deployment via Configuration Management
C:\Temp\Deploy folder before installation. This triggers the rule as the extraction process reads and writes files matching the 12 IOCs.ccmexec.exe (SCCM) or ansible-runner, specifically when the file path contains keywords like \Temp\Deploy\ or \SoftwareDistribution\. A time-based filter can also be applied to suppress alerts during the known maintenance window (e.g., Sundays 02:00–06:00 UTC).