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snip3-aviation-targeting-emails

kql MEDIUM Azure-Sentinel
EmailEventsEmailUrlInfo
backdoorhuntingmicrosoftofficialpersistence
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at Azure-Sentinel →
Retrieved: 2026-05-07T11:00:00Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

The hypothesis is that the detection rule identifies potential Snip3 remote access trojan activity through suspicious email targeting behavior, which is a common initial vector for adversaries to establish persistence. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to detect and mitigate early-stage compromise attempts by Snip3 variants before they escalate.

KQL Query

let SubjectTerms = 
pack_array("Cargo Charter","Airbus Meeting","WorldWide Symposium","Airbus Family","Flight Request",
"Advice from NetJets","May/ACMI","AIRCRAFT PRESENTATION","Airworthiness", "Air Quote", "RFQ #9B17811");
EmailEvents
| where SenderDisplayName has_any(SubjectTerms)
// Optional Sender restriction for organizations with high FP
// where SenderIpv4 == "192.145.239.18"  
| where EmailDirection == "Inbound"  
| join EmailUrlInfo on $left.NetworkMessageId == $right.NetworkMessageId
| where Url has_any("drive.google.com","1drv.ms","onedrive.live.com")
| take 100

Analytic Rule Definition

id: cfffcab3-d4c7-4aad-b80d-5f415ef5ac66
name: snip3-aviation-targeting-emails
description: |
  Snip3 is a family of related remote access trojans. Although the malware in this family contain numerous small variations, they all exhibit similar behaviors and techniques.
  The following query looks for keywords observed in emails involved in a Snip3-associated campaign in April and May of 2021. The emails often have an aviation theme, and the campaign primarily targets organizations involved in travel or  aviation. Note that keywords may change overtime. These emails were used to send malicious legitimate hosting provider links that redirected to VBS documents hosting loaders. The loaders initiate RevengeRAT or AsyncRAT downloads that eventually establish persistence on targets and exfiltrate data.
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - EmailEvents
  - EmailUrlInfo
tactics:
- Initial access
query: |
  let SubjectTerms = 
  pack_array("Cargo Charter","Airbus Meeting","WorldWide Symposium","Airbus Family","Flight Request",
  "Advice from NetJets","May/ACMI","AIRCRAFT PRESENTATION","Airworthiness", "Air Quote", "RFQ #9B17811");
  EmailEvents
  | where SenderDisplayName has_any(SubjectTerms)
  // Optional Sender restriction for organizations with high FP
  // where SenderIpv4 == "192.145.239.18"  
  | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"  
  | join EmailUrlInfo on $left.NetworkMessageId == $right.NetworkMessageId
  | where Url has_any("drive.google.com","1drv.ms","onedrive.live.com")
  | take 100

Required Data Sources

Sentinel TableNotes
EmailEventsEnsure this data connector is enabled
EmailUrlInfoEnsure this data connector is enabled

MITRE ATT&CK Context

References

False Positive Guidance

Original source: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/main/Hunting Queries/Microsoft 365 Defender/Campaigns/snip3-aviation-targeting-emails.yaml