Detects Shamoon 2.0 Wiper Component

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt targets adversaries deploying the Shamoon 2.0 wiper component to systematically corrupt critical infrastructure by overwriting system files and disrupting operations. Proactively hunting for this behavior in Azure Sentinel is essential because early identification of these specific file modification patterns allows SOC teams to isolate affected assets before a full-scale data destruction event compromises business continuity.

YARA Rule

rule Shamoon2_Wiper {
   meta:
      description = "Detects Shamoon 2.0 Wiper Component"
      author = "Florian Roth"
      reference = "https://goo.gl/jKIfGB"
      date = "2016-12-01"
      score = 70
      hash1 = "c7fc1f9c2bed748b50a599ee2fa609eb7c9ddaeb9cd16633ba0d10cf66891d8a"
      hash2 = "128fa5815c6fee68463b18051c1a1ccdf28c599ce321691686b1efa4838a2acd"
   strings:
      $a1 = "\\??\\%s\\System32\\%s.exe" fullword wide
      $x1 = "IWHBWWHVCIDBRAFUASIIWURRTWRTIBIVJDGWTRRREFDEAEBIAEBJGGCSVUHGVJUHADIEWAFGWADRUWDTJBHTSITDVVBCIDCWHRHVTDVCDESTHWSUAEHGTWTJWFIRTBRB" wide
      $s1 = "UFWYNYNTS" fullword wide
      $s2 = "\\\\?\\ElRawDisk" fullword wide
   condition:
      ( uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 1000KB and 2 of them ) or ( 3 of them )
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 4 string patterns in its detection logic.

References

• https://goo.gl/jKIfGB
• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are specific false positive scenarios for the Shamoon 2.0 Wiper Component detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:

• Enterprise Antivirus Scheduled Scans

  • Scenario: The rule triggers when enterprise endpoint protection suites (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, or Symantec Endpoint Protection) perform their daily scheduled “Deep Scan” or “On-Demand Scan.” These scans often invoke the same low-level file system enumeration and process injection behaviors that mimic Shamoon’s initial reconnaissance phase.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion based on the Parent Process Name (e.g., MsMpEng.exe, CSAgent.exe, or rtvscan.exe) and restrict the alert to only trigger when the parent process is NOT a known security agent. Additionally, exclude file paths located within standard AV quarantine directories (e.g., C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Scans\History).

• Patch Management Deployment Jobs

  • Scenario: Automated patch management tools like Ivanti, SCCM (System Center Configuration Manager), or Jamf Pro execute deployment scripts that temporarily replace system binaries to update drivers or OS components. This activity generates file modification and process creation events identical to the wiper’s payload delivery mechanism, particularly when updating critical system folders (C:\Windows\System32).
  • Filter/Exclusion: Implement a filter excluding alerts where the User Account belongs to the System account or specific service accounts (e.g., svc_patch_deploy, SCCMAgent) and the execution time aligns with known maintenance windows (e.g., 01:00–04:00 local time).

• Legacy Application Maintenance Scripts

  • Scenario: Legacy enterprise applications, such as **Oracle Database