Yara rule for Predator The Thief v2.3.5 & +

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt targets adversaries utilizing “Predator The Thief” malware to execute data exfiltration or credential theft via specific file signatures identified by version 2.3.5 and later. Proactively hunting for this behavior in Azure Sentinel is critical because its low severity classification may cause it to be overlooked during routine monitoring, allowing persistent threats to operate undetected within the environment.

YARA Rule

rule Predator_The_Thief : Predator_The_Thief {
   meta:
        description = "Yara rule for Predator The Thief v2.3.5 & +"
        author = "Fumik0_"
        date = "2018/10/12"
        source = "https://fumik0.com/2018/10/15/predator-the-thief-in-depth-analysis-v2-3-5/"
   strings:
        $mz = { 4D 5A }

        $hex1 = { BF 00 00 40 06 } 
        $hex2 = { C6 04 31 6B }
        $hex3 = { C6 04 31 63 }
        $hex4 = { C6 04 31 75 }
        $hex5 = { C6 04 31 66 }

        $s1 = "sqlite_" ascii wide
   condition:
        $mz at 0 and all of ($hex*) and all of ($s*)
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 7 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the Predator The Thief detection rule in an enterprise environment, including suggested filters and exclusions:

• Antivirus Definition Updates via Windows Update or EDR Agents

  • Scenario: The Predator malware often mimics legitimate system maintenance by injecting code into svchost.exe or creating temporary files during security scans. When major Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents like CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne, or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint push large definition updates, they frequently spawn child processes that match the specific file hashes or behavioral patterns defined in the Yara rule (e.g., accessing C:\Windows\Temp with high entropy).
  • Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Create a whitelist exclusion for known EDR update executables. Specifically, exclude process paths containing \Program Files\CrowdStrike\, \ProgramData\Microsoft Defender Antivirus\, and the specific command line arguments related to “Update” or “Scan” (e.g., * /update *).

• Scheduled Software Deployment via SCCM or Intune

  • Scenario: Enterprise deployment tools like Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (MECM/SCCM) or Microsoft Intune often execute silent installations of third-party applications. These deployments frequently utilize PowerShell scripts (powershell.exe) to download and unpack installers, which can trigger the Yara rule’s logic regarding “file creation in user temp directories” and “network connection establishment,” behaviors common to Predator The Thief during its initial infection phase.
  • Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Implement a filter based on the parent process name. Exclude events where the parent process is ccmexec.exe (SCCM) or IntuneManagementExtension.exe. Additionally, exclude file paths located within the standard deployment staging folder: `C:\Windows\CCMCache\