Detects potential process injection via Microsoft Remote Asssistance (Msra.exe) by looking at suspicious child processes spawned from the aforementioned process. It has been a target used by many thre
title: Potential Process Injection Via Msra.EXE
id: 744a188b-0415-4792-896f-11ddb0588dbc
status: test
description: Detects potential process injection via Microsoft Remote Asssistance (Msra.exe) by looking at suspicious child processes spawned from the aforementioned process. It has been a target used by many threat actors and used for discovery and persistence tactics
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/09/a-closer-look-at-qakbots-latest-building-blocks-and-how-to-knock-them-down/
- https://www.fortinet.com/content/dam/fortinet/assets/analyst-reports/ar-qakbot.pdf
author: Alexander McDonald
date: 2022-06-24
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1055
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\msra.exe'
ParentCommandLine|endswith: 'msra.exe'
Image|endswith:
- '\arp.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\net.exe'
- '\netstat.exe'
- '\nslookup.exe'
- '\route.exe'
- '\schtasks.exe'
- '\whoami.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of Msra.exe
level: high
imProcessCreate
| where (ParentProcessName endswith "\\msra.exe" or ActingProcessName endswith "\\msra.exe") and ActingProcessCommandLine endswith "msra.exe" and (TargetProcessName endswith "\\arp.exe" or TargetProcessName endswith "\\cmd.exe" or TargetProcessName endswith "\\net.exe" or TargetProcessName endswith "\\netstat.exe" or TargetProcessName endswith "\\nslookup.exe" or TargetProcessName endswith "\\route.exe" or TargetProcessName endswith "\\schtasks.exe" or TargetProcessName endswith "\\whoami.exe")
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
imProcessCreate | Ensure this data connector is enabled |