IndiaCharlie One

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection targets the specific execution patterns of the IndiaCharlie malware family to identify potential supply chain compromises or lateral movement within Azure Sentinel workloads. Proactively hunting for this low-severity indicator is critical because early identification of IndiaCharlie’s unique behavioral signatures allows the SOC team to validate its presence before it escalates into a more severe data exfiltration event.

YARA Rule

rule IndiaCharlie_One
{
	meta:
		copyright = "2015 Novetta Solutions"
		author = "Novetta Threat Research & Interdiction Group - [email protected]"

	strings:
		$ = "WMPNetworkSvcUpdate"
		$ = "backSched.dll"
		$ = "\\mspaint.exe"
		$aesKey = "X,LLIe{))%%l2i<[AM|aq!Ql/lPlw]d7@C-#j.<c|#*}Kx4_H(q^F-F^p/[t#%HT"
	condition:
		2 of them or $aesKey
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the IndiaCharlie_One detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with recommended filters or exclusions:

• Endpoint Protection Scheduled Scans

  • Scenario: The YARA rule detects the execution of a legitimate security scanner (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne, or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) running its daily scheduled scan. These agents often spawn child processes with similar command-line arguments and memory signatures to the IndiaCharlie malware, particularly when scanning large file repositories in the C:\ProgramData directory.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude process paths containing known EDR agent binaries (e.g., C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike\csagent.exe) and restrict detection to non-scheduled execution times if the scan window is fixed (e.g., 02:00–04:00 UTC).

• Software Deployment via SCCM or Intune

  • Scenario: During a mass software update cycle, tools like Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Intune Win32 App Installer execute installation scripts that unpack archives and launch temporary executables. If the deployment package involves Java-based applications or .NET installers, the file creation and process injection patterns may mimic the initial infection vector of IndiaCharlie.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion for parent processes identified as ccmexec.exe (SCCM) or Microsoft.Insights.Agent.exe, specifically filtering events where the User Account is a service account (e.g., DOMAIN\SCCM-Deploy-SVC).

• IT Admin Patching and Maintenance Scripts

  • Scenario: System administrators running PowerShell scripts via Task Scheduler to apply security patches or manage Group Policy Objects. A script utilizing Invoke-WebRequest to download updates and `