IndiaAlfa Two

Hunt Hypothesis

This hypothesis posits that adversaries are deploying the IndiaAlfa malware variant to establish persistence and execute lateral movement within Azure workloads. Proactive hunting for this specific signature in Azure Sentinel is critical despite its low severity rating, as early detection of IndiaAlfa can prevent silent data exfiltration before it escalates into a broader compromise.

YARA Rule

rule IndiaAlfa_Two
{
	meta:
		copyright = "2015 Novetta Solutions"
		author = "Novetta Threat Research & Interdiction Group - [email protected]"

	strings:
		$ = "ExePath: %s\nXlsPath: %s\nTmpPath: %s\n"
		
	condition:
		any of them

}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints
• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the IndiaAlfa Two detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with suggested filters or exclusions:

• Scenario: Scheduled Endpoint Protection Scans by CrowdStrike Falcon

  • Context: The YARA rule likely detects the execution of falcon.sys or related scanning binaries that mimic the behavior of IndiaAlfa malware (e.g., specific memory allocation patterns or network handshake sequences). In a large enterprise, CrowdStrike agents perform deep integrity scans on critical servers every night at 02:00 AM.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion based on the Process Image Path and Parent Process. Exclude alerts where ImagePath contains \CrowdStrike\ AND ParentImageName is falcon-sensor.exe. Additionally, restrict the rule to trigger only outside of business hours (02:00–04:00) if the scan window is known.

• Scenario: Automated Patch Deployment via SCCM (Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager)

  • Context: During monthly patch cycles, the SCCM client (ccmexec.exe) executes installation scripts that launch temporary worker processes with similar file signatures to IndiaAlfa. These workers often create temporary files in %TEMP% and establish outbound connections to Microsoft Update servers, triggering the YARA logic.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Implement a filter on the Process Command Line. Exclude events where CommandLine contains keywords such as /Install, Microsoft.Update, or CCM. Furthermore, whitelist the specific hash of the SCCM client executable (ccmexec.exe) to prevent recursive detection of its spawned children.

• Scenario: Database Maintenance Jobs by SQL Server Agent

  • Context: The IndiaAlfa rule may flag database maintenance routines that perform heavy I/O and memory operations similar to the