gholeeV1

Hunt Hypothesis

This hypothesis posits that adversaries are deploying the specific malware signature identified by the gholeeV1 YARA rule to establish initial footholds within Azure workloads. Proactive hunting is essential because this low-severity indicator may represent early-stage reconnaissance or a precursor to more critical lateral movements that automated alerts alone might overlook in the absence of defined MITRE techniques.

YARA Rule

rule gholeeV1
{
    meta:
	 Author = "@GelosSnake"
    	 Date = "2014/08"
    	 Description = "Gholee first discovered variant "
	 Reference = "http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/28170/cyber-crime/gholee-malware.html" 

    strings:
    	 $a = "sandbox_avg10_vc9_SP1_2011"
    	 $b = "gholee"

    condition:
    	 all of them
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 2 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the gholeeV1 detection rule in an enterprise environment, including suggested filters and exclusions:

• Endpoint Protection Scans by CrowdStrike Falcon

  • Scenario: The YARA rule detects legitimate scanning activity when the CrowdStrike Falcon sensor performs its scheduled on-access or on-demand deep scan of the C:\Windows\System32 directory. This often triggers because the scanner process (csfalcon.exe) reads and hashes executable files that match the generic signature patterns defined in gholeeV1.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes where the parent image path contains \CrowdStrike\ or the specific process name is csfalcon.exe. Additionally, filter out events originating from the “On-Access” scan type within the EDR logs.

• Software Deployment via Microsoft SCCM (Configuration Manager)

  • Scenario: During a scheduled weekly patch Tuesday deployment, the SCCM client (ccmexec.exe) extracts and installs application updates into user profiles or system directories. The extraction of compressed archives containing new binaries often mimics the file creation behavior targeted by gholeeV1, particularly when deploying standard line-of-business applications like Adobe Acrobat or Java updates.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion for processes initiated by ccmexec.exe where the command line arguments contain keywords such as /install, /update, or specific package IDs (e.g., APP00123). Whitelist the known SCCM distribution point IP addresses if network-based triggers are involved.

• Backup Operations using Veeam Backup & Replication

  • Scenario: The rule fires during nightly backup windows when the Veeam Agent (VeeamAgent.exe) or the Veeam Transport Service scans and reads large volumes of data to create incremental backups. The