This hypothesis posits that adversaries are deploying destructive cleaning utilities to sanitize evidence or disrupt forensic analysis following an initial compromise. Proactive hunting for this behavior in Azure Sentinel is critical because early identification of these tools can reveal post-exploitation activities before they escalate into data loss or incident response delays, even when the associated severity is currently low.
rule DestructiveTargetCleaningTool7
{
strings:
$a = "SetFilePointer"
$b = "SetEndOfFile"
$c = {75 17 56 ff 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6a 00 6a 00 6a 00 56 ff D5 56 ff 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 56}
condition:
(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 3 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the DestructiveTargetCleaningTool7 detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with suggested filters or exclusions:
Windows Server Storage Optimization via sdelete
sdelete.exe utility on file servers to securely wipe free disk space (using the -z flag) after large data migrations. This tool performs low-level overwrite operations that mimic destructive cleaning behaviors, triggering the rule when it accesses and modifies volume metadata.ImageName is sdelete.exe, CommandLine contains the -z or -p flags, and the process is running under a known Service Account (e.g., DOMAIN\svc_storage_admin).Endpoint DLP Agent Cache Purge
C:\ProgramData\DLP\Cache directory. This involves deleting thousands of small files in rapid succession, which the YARA rule interprets as a targeted destructive cleaning event.\Symantec\Endpoint Protection\ or \Forcepoint\, specifically targeting executable names like DlpAgentService.exe or CacheCleaner.exe running during the maintenance window (02:00 – 04:00 local time).Microsoft SCCM/MECM Software Update Cleanup