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check-for-shadowhammer-activity-implant

kql MEDIUM Azure-Sentinel
DeviceFileEventsDeviceImageLoadEventsDeviceNetworkEventsDeviceProcessEvents
backdoorhuntingmicrosoftofficial
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at Azure-Sentinel →
Retrieved: 2026-05-20T11:00:00Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

Adversaries may be leveraging compromised ASUS update mechanisms to deploy malicious payloads, indicating potential supply chain compromise. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to detect and mitigate ShadowHammer-like supply chain attacks before they cause widespread damage.

KQL Query

// Event types that may be associated with the implant or container
union DeviceProcessEvents , DeviceNetworkEvents , DeviceFileEvents , DeviceImageLoadEvents 
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
// File SHAs for implant and container
| where InitiatingProcessSHA1 in("e01c1047001206c52c87b8197d772db2a1d3b7b4",
"e005c58331eb7db04782fdf9089111979ce1406f", "69c08086c164e58a6d0398b0ffdcb957930b4cf2")

Analytic Rule Definition

id: fb6f89ae-4af3-4c37-8f12-d719e882e8a5
name: check-for-shadowhammer-activity-implant
description: |
  This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, ShadowHammer supply chain attack
  Operation ShadowHammer was an attack against ASUS computer hardware, using the company's own update infrastructure to deliver malware to the company's products. The campaign ran from June to November, 2018. ASUS has since responded with updates that protect their Live Update system, and diagnostic tools to check affected systems.
  The following query checks for activity associated with the ShadowHammer implant or container over the past 30 days.
  References:
  https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pan9wn/hackers-hijacked-asus-software-updates-to-install-backdoors-on-thousands-of-computers
  https://www.asus.com/News/hqfgVUyZ6uyAyJe1
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - DeviceProcessEvents
  - DeviceNetworkEvents
  - DeviceFileEvents
  - DeviceImageLoadEvents
tactics:
- Execution
- Persistence
- Command and control
query: |
  // Event types that may be associated with the implant or container
  union DeviceProcessEvents , DeviceNetworkEvents , DeviceFileEvents , DeviceImageLoadEvents 
  | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
  // File SHAs for implant and container
  | where InitiatingProcessSHA1 in("e01c1047001206c52c87b8197d772db2a1d3b7b4",
  "e005c58331eb7db04782fdf9089111979ce1406f", "69c08086c164e58a6d0398b0ffdcb957930b4cf2")

Required Data Sources

Sentinel TableNotes
DeviceFileEventsEnsure this data connector is enabled
DeviceImageLoadEventsEnsure this data connector is enabled
DeviceNetworkEventsEnsure this data connector is enabled
DeviceProcessEventsEnsure this data connector is enabled

MITRE ATT&CK Context

References

False Positive Guidance

Original source: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/main/Hunting Queries/Microsoft 365 Defender/Execution/check-for-shadowhammer-activity-implant.yaml