This detection rule identifies adversary behavior consistent with the CTB-Locker ransomware family, specifically focusing on its initial reconnaissance and file encryption activities within the environment. The SOC team should proactively hunt for these indicators in Azure Sentinel to validate early-stage infection signals before they escalate into high-severity incidents that disrupt critical business operations.
rule BackdoorFCKG: CTB_Locker_Ransomware
{
meta:
author = "ISG"
date = "2015-01-20"
reference = "https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/rise-backdoor-fckq-ctb-locker"
description = "CTB_Locker"
strings:
$string0 = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
$stringl = "RNDBAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
$string2 = "keme132.DLL"
$string3 = "klospad.pdb"
condition:
3 of them
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 4 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the CTB_Locker detection rule in an enterprise environment, including suggested filters and exclusions:
Endpoint Protection Policy Deployment via SCCM/Intune
CTB_Locker as it modifies registry keys and file permissions associated with the locker service, mimicking an unauthorized lock attempt.ccmexec.exe (SCCM) or Microsoft.IntuneManagementExtension.exe running under the SYSTEM account during defined maintenance windows (02:00–04:00 local time).Automated Backup Job Execution by Veeam
VeeamAgent.exe or vbragent64.exe and the target volume matches known backup mount points (e.g., D:\DB_Data, E:\SQL_Logs).Group Policy Object (GPO) Refresh for Compliance
gpupdate.exe. This periodic configuration change