The hypothesis is that the detection identifies potential generation of Derusbi malware by an adversary leveraging custom code generation techniques to evade traditional signature-based detection. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify early-stage APT activity and prevent lateral movement and data exfiltration.
YARA Rule
rule APT_Derusbi_Gen
{
meta:
author = "ThreatConnect Intelligence Research Team"
strings:
$2 = "273ce6-b29f-90d618c0" wide ascii
$A = "Ace123dx" fullword wide ascii
$A1 = "Ace123dxl!" fullword wide ascii
$A2 = "Ace123dx!@#x" fullword wide ascii
$C = "/Catelog/login1.asp" wide ascii
$DF = "~DFTMP$$$$$.1" wide ascii
$G = "GET /Query.asp?loginid=" wide ascii
$L = "LoadConfigFromReg failded" wide ascii
$L1 = "LoadConfigFromBuildin success" wide ascii
$ph = "/photoe/photo.asp HTTP" wide ascii
$PO = "POST /photos/photo.asp" wide ascii
$PC = "PCC_IDENT" wide ascii
condition:
any of them
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 12 string patterns in its detection logic.
Scenario: Legitimate scheduled system maintenance job using schtasks.exe
Filter/Exclusion: process.parent_process == "schtasks.exe" or process.name == "schtasks.exe"
Scenario: Admin using reg.exe to modify registry settings during routine configuration
Filter/Exclusion: process.name == "reg.exe" and process.parent_process != "explorer.exe"
Scenario: IT staff using PowerShell to automate user account management via Invoke-Command
Filter/Exclusion: process.name == "powershell.exe" and process.command_line contains "Invoke-Command"
Scenario: System update process using msiexec.exe to install patches
Filter/Exclusion: process.name == "msiexec.exe" and process.command_line contains "/i"
Scenario: Database backup using sqlcmd.exe with scheduled task
Filter/Exclusion: process.name == "sqlcmd.exe" and process.parent_process == "schtasks.exe"